Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 190-202 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | International Journal of Public Administration |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 16 Dec 2016 |
| Publication status | Published - 17 Feb 2018 |
Abstract
Keywords
- Moral hazard, Politics and bureaucracy, Principal agent, Regulatory agencies
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Business and International Management
- Social Sciences(all)
- Public Administration
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In: International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 41, No. 3, 17.02.2018, p. 190-202.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Discovering the Dark Side of Power
T2 - The Principal’s Moral Hazard in Political-Bureaucratic Relations
AU - Döhler, Marian
N1 - © 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
PY - 2018/2/17
Y1 - 2018/2/17
N2 - Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as “bureaucratic drift”, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal’s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions.
AB - Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as “bureaucratic drift”, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal’s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions.
KW - Moral hazard
KW - Politics and bureaucracy
KW - Principal agent
KW - Regulatory agencies
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85006314652&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/01900692.2016.1256893
DO - 10.1080/01900692.2016.1256893
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85006314652
VL - 41
SP - 190
EP - 202
JO - International Journal of Public Administration
JF - International Journal of Public Administration
SN - 0190-0692
IS - 3
ER -