Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 34-37 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economics letters |
| Volume | 138 |
| Early online date | 2 Dec 2015 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2016 |
Abstract
We study evolutionary stability for public goods games incentivized by a contest. In a quasi-linear setting, we derive conditions such that evolutionary stability, Nash equilibrium and efficient solution coincide.
Keywords
- Contests, Finite-player ESS, Public goods games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Finance
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: Economics letters, Vol. 138, 01.2016, p. 34-37.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Contests, private provision of public goods and evolutionary stability
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2016/1
Y1 - 2016/1
N2 - We study evolutionary stability for public goods games incentivized by a contest. In a quasi-linear setting, we derive conditions such that evolutionary stability, Nash equilibrium and efficient solution coincide.
AB - We study evolutionary stability for public goods games incentivized by a contest. In a quasi-linear setting, we derive conditions such that evolutionary stability, Nash equilibrium and efficient solution coincide.
KW - Contests
KW - Finite-player ESS
KW - Public goods games
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84949871302&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.018
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.018
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84949871302
VL - 138
SP - 34
EP - 37
JO - Economics letters
JF - Economics letters
SN - 0165-1765
ER -