Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 161-179 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Southern economic journal |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2012 |
Abstract
The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: Southern economic journal, Vol. 79, No. 1, 07.2012, p. 161-179.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods
AU - Kolmar, Martin
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2012/7
Y1 - 2012/7
N2 - The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.
AB - The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84866716843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.161
DO - 10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.161
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84866716843
VL - 79
SP - 161
EP - 179
JO - Southern economic journal
JF - Southern economic journal
SN - 0038-4038
IS - 1
ER -