Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 4 |
| Journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 8 Jan 2020 |
Abstract
This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what level of detail and precision does a construct have to possess such that a test can in principle be valid relative to it? And second, what kind of evidence needs to be in place such that a test can be regarded as validated relative to a given construct? I argue that construct validity is not an all-or-nothing affair. It can come in degrees, because (a) both our constructs and our knowledge of the explanatory relation between constructs and data can vary in accuracy and level of detail, and (b) a test can fail to measure all of the features associated with a construct. I conclude by arguing in favor of greater philosophical attention to processes of construct development.
Keywords
- Construct validity, Epistemology of experimentation, IAT, Implicit bias, Implicit tests, Philosophy of psychology
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 4, 08.01.2020.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Construct validity in psychological tests
T2 - the case of implicit social cognition
AU - Feest, Uljana
PY - 2020/1/8
Y1 - 2020/1/8
N2 - This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what level of detail and precision does a construct have to possess such that a test can in principle be valid relative to it? And second, what kind of evidence needs to be in place such that a test can be regarded as validated relative to a given construct? I argue that construct validity is not an all-or-nothing affair. It can come in degrees, because (a) both our constructs and our knowledge of the explanatory relation between constructs and data can vary in accuracy and level of detail, and (b) a test can fail to measure all of the features associated with a construct. I conclude by arguing in favor of greater philosophical attention to processes of construct development.
AB - This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what level of detail and precision does a construct have to possess such that a test can in principle be valid relative to it? And second, what kind of evidence needs to be in place such that a test can be regarded as validated relative to a given construct? I argue that construct validity is not an all-or-nothing affair. It can come in degrees, because (a) both our constructs and our knowledge of the explanatory relation between constructs and data can vary in accuracy and level of detail, and (b) a test can fail to measure all of the features associated with a construct. I conclude by arguing in favor of greater philosophical attention to processes of construct development.
KW - Construct validity
KW - Epistemology of experimentation
KW - IAT
KW - Implicit bias
KW - Implicit tests
KW - Philosophy of psychology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85077633307&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s13194-019-0270-8
DO - 10.1007/s13194-019-0270-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85077633307
VL - 10
JO - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
SN - 1879-4912
IS - 1
M1 - 4
ER -