Details
| Translated title of the contribution | Colonel Blotto and his economic applications |
|---|---|
| Original language | German |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-11 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 21 Feb 2011 |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2011 |
Abstract
Redistributional issues are important in contemporary welfare states. These issues cannot be analyzed using the median voter theorem because preferences fail single-peakedness: Collective preferences are intransitive, giving rise to cyclical preferences. A suitable instrument for analyzing redistributional issues is the Colonel Blotto game. This game is older than the more familiar prisoner's dilemma, but it has been solved only recently. The article introduces the Colonel Blotto Game as well as the general structure of its solutions. Thereafter, the game's logic is illustrated using several policy examples. The two most fascinating results state that, in a political contest, it is never optimal to use pure strategies, and that the political process itself induces remarkable inequalities.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Social Sciences(all)
- Political Science and International Relations
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In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 12, No. 1, 02.2011, p. 1-11.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen
AU - Homburg, Stefan
PY - 2011/2
Y1 - 2011/2
N2 - Redistributional issues are important in contemporary welfare states. These issues cannot be analyzed using the median voter theorem because preferences fail single-peakedness: Collective preferences are intransitive, giving rise to cyclical preferences. A suitable instrument for analyzing redistributional issues is the Colonel Blotto game. This game is older than the more familiar prisoner's dilemma, but it has been solved only recently. The article introduces the Colonel Blotto Game as well as the general structure of its solutions. Thereafter, the game's logic is illustrated using several policy examples. The two most fascinating results state that, in a political contest, it is never optimal to use pure strategies, and that the political process itself induces remarkable inequalities.
AB - Redistributional issues are important in contemporary welfare states. These issues cannot be analyzed using the median voter theorem because preferences fail single-peakedness: Collective preferences are intransitive, giving rise to cyclical preferences. A suitable instrument for analyzing redistributional issues is the Colonel Blotto game. This game is older than the more familiar prisoner's dilemma, but it has been solved only recently. The article introduces the Colonel Blotto Game as well as the general structure of its solutions. Thereafter, the game's logic is illustrated using several policy examples. The two most fascinating results state that, in a political contest, it is never optimal to use pure strategies, and that the political process itself induces remarkable inequalities.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79952658039&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2010.00347.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2010.00347.x
M3 - Artikel
AN - SCOPUS:79952658039
VL - 12
SP - 1
EP - 11
JO - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
JF - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
SN - 1465-6493
IS - 1
ER -