Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 997-1007 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2021 |
Abstract
Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 88, No. 5, 12.2021, p. 997-1007.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos
AU - Dethier, Corey Nathaniel
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones.
AB - Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85120682527&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/714705
DO - 10.1086/714705
M3 - Article
VL - 88
SP - 997
EP - 1007
JO - Philosophy of Science
JF - Philosophy of Science
SN - 0031-8248
IS - 5
ER -