Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 92-101 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 8 Feb 2009 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all 'extra-scientific' influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.
Keywords
- Bias, Science and values, Social epistemology
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Vol. 40, No. 1, 03.2009, p. 92-101.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Bias and values in scientific research
AU - Wilholt, Torsten
N1 - Copyright: Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2009/3
Y1 - 2009/3
N2 - When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all 'extra-scientific' influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.
AB - When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all 'extra-scientific' influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.
KW - Bias
KW - Science and values
KW - Social epistemology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67649388053&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.12.005
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.12.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:67649388053
VL - 40
SP - 92
EP - 101
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
SN - 0039-3681
IS - 1
ER -