Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 104561 |
| Journal | European economic review |
| Volume | 159 |
| Early online date | 8 Aug 2023 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2023 |
Abstract
Previous experimental research has shown that cooperation is especially challenging in situations involving heterogeneous actors. Here, we investigate the effect of allowing unconditional transfers in a public goods game when actors differ asymmetrically in their endowments and productivity levels. Under this setup, full efficiency, in terms of highest maximum group payoff, can only be achieved with the full transfer of resources from the players with high endowment and low productivity to the players with high productivity but low endowment. We show that, in this setting, the availability of transfers enhances public good provision and cooperation. The voluntary transfer serves as a powerful cooperative signal, leading to high contribution rates among the recipients. However, if the transfer possibility is given but not used, cooperation erodes.
Keywords
- Cooperation, Heterogeneity, Inequality, Public goods game, Transfers
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Finance
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: European economic review, Vol. 159, 104561, 10.2023.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetric heterogeneities and the role of transfers in a public goods experiment
AU - Koessler, Ann Kathrin
AU - Müller, Julia
AU - Zitzelsberger, Sonja
N1 - Funding Information: This work was financially supported by the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, Grant Number 636746. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the German Association for Experimental Economic Research (https://gfew.de/ethik/qpAfJtwu). We thank Astrid Dannenberg, the editor David K. Levine and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. We thank G. Simmonett for the proofreading of the manuscript.
PY - 2023/10
Y1 - 2023/10
N2 - Previous experimental research has shown that cooperation is especially challenging in situations involving heterogeneous actors. Here, we investigate the effect of allowing unconditional transfers in a public goods game when actors differ asymmetrically in their endowments and productivity levels. Under this setup, full efficiency, in terms of highest maximum group payoff, can only be achieved with the full transfer of resources from the players with high endowment and low productivity to the players with high productivity but low endowment. We show that, in this setting, the availability of transfers enhances public good provision and cooperation. The voluntary transfer serves as a powerful cooperative signal, leading to high contribution rates among the recipients. However, if the transfer possibility is given but not used, cooperation erodes.
AB - Previous experimental research has shown that cooperation is especially challenging in situations involving heterogeneous actors. Here, we investigate the effect of allowing unconditional transfers in a public goods game when actors differ asymmetrically in their endowments and productivity levels. Under this setup, full efficiency, in terms of highest maximum group payoff, can only be achieved with the full transfer of resources from the players with high endowment and low productivity to the players with high productivity but low endowment. We show that, in this setting, the availability of transfers enhances public good provision and cooperation. The voluntary transfer serves as a powerful cooperative signal, leading to high contribution rates among the recipients. However, if the transfer possibility is given but not used, cooperation erodes.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Heterogeneity
KW - Inequality
KW - Public goods game
KW - Transfers
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85171676310&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104561
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104561
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85171676310
VL - 159
JO - European economic review
JF - European economic review
SN - 0014-2921
M1 - 104561
ER -