Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1417-1426 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Philosophy of science |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 17 Feb 2023 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2023 |
Abstract
Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have advanced a possibilist interpretation: climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur but do not provide information about how probable those scenarios are. This article argues that possibilism is (1) undermotivated, (2) incompatible with successful practices in the science, and (3) unable to correct for known biases. The upshot is that the models should be interpreted probabilistically in at least some cases.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: Philosophy of science, Vol. 90, No. 5, 12.2023, p. 1417-1426.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Against "Possibilist" Interpretations of Climate Models
AU - Dethier, Corey
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association.
PY - 2023/12
Y1 - 2023/12
N2 - Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have advanced a possibilist interpretation: climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur but do not provide information about how probable those scenarios are. This article argues that possibilism is (1) undermotivated, (2) incompatible with successful practices in the science, and (3) unable to correct for known biases. The upshot is that the models should be interpreted probabilistically in at least some cases.
AB - Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have advanced a possibilist interpretation: climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur but do not provide information about how probable those scenarios are. This article argues that possibilism is (1) undermotivated, (2) incompatible with successful practices in the science, and (3) unable to correct for known biases. The upshot is that the models should be interpreted probabilistically in at least some cases.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85187122953&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/psa.2023.6
DO - 10.1017/psa.2023.6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85187122953
VL - 90
SP - 1417
EP - 1426
JO - Philosophy of science
JF - Philosophy of science
SN - 0031-8248
IS - 5
ER -