Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2285-2301 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 179 |
| Issue number | 7 |
| Early online date | 23 Dec 2021 |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2022 |
Abstract
The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone.
Keywords
- Accuracy-dominance, Accuracy-first epistemology, Epistemic utility theory, Probablism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
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In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 179, No. 7, 07.2022, p. 2285-2301.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Accuracy, Probabilism, and the Insufficiency of the Alethic
AU - Dethier, Corey Nathaniel
N1 - Funding Information: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Funding for this paper was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—Project 254954344/GRK2073.
PY - 2022/7
Y1 - 2022/7
N2 - The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone.
AB - The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone.
KW - Accuracy-dominance
KW - Accuracy-first epistemology
KW - Epistemic utility theory
KW - Probablism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85121615456&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-021-01763-5
DO - 10.1007/s11098-021-01763-5
M3 - Article
VL - 179
SP - 2285
EP - 2301
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 7
ER -