Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 20160151 |
| Journal | B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 18 Jan 2018 |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Abstract
Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.
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In: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 20160151, 2018.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A Note on Cohabitation and Marriage
AU - Jelnov, Artyom
AU - Jelnov, Pavel
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.
AB - Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.
KW - cohabitation
KW - marriage
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85040983930&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1515/bejte-2016-0151
DO - 10.1515/bejte-2016-0151
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85040983930
VL - 18
JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
SN - 1935-1704
IS - 2
M1 - 20160151
ER -