Zum Einfluss der öffentlichen Meinung auf Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Eine Analyse von abstrakten Normenkontrollen sowie Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten 1974 – 2010

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Autorschaft

  • Sebastian Sternberg
  • Thomas Gschwend
  • Caroline Wittig
  • Benjamin Gerhard Engst

Organisationseinheiten

Externe Organisationen

  • Universität Mannheim
Forschungs-netzwerk anzeigen

Details

OriginalspracheDeutsch
Seiten (von - bis)570-598
Seitenumfang29
FachzeitschriftPolitische Vierteljahresschrift
Jahrgang56
Ausgabenummer4
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2015

Abstract

Is the Federal Constitutional Court, as often depicted, a mostly independent ac-tor in the German political system? The present analysis shows for the first time to what extent public opinion has a systematic influence on the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Our evidence is based on the analysis of abstract judicial reviews and federal state disputes from 1974 to 2010. We show that the Federal Constitutional Court is the more likely to rule in favor of the opposition, the stronger the public supports the specific sub-stantive position of the opposition. Two mechanisms that could bring about this correla-tion are finally discussed. While the court does not blindly follow public opinion it will nevertheless consider the acceptance of its decisions as an important source of legitimacy.

Schlagwörter

    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Öffentliche Meinung, Justizialisierung, abstrakte Normenkontrollen, Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten

Zitieren

Zum Einfluss der öffentlichen Meinung auf Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Eine Analyse von abstrakten Normenkontrollen sowie Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten 1974 – 2010. / Sternberg, Sebastian; Gschwend, Thomas; Wittig, Caroline et al.
in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Jahrgang 56, Nr. 4, 2015, S. 570-598.

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Download
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AB - Is the Federal Constitutional Court, as often depicted, a mostly independent ac-tor in the German political system? The present analysis shows for the first time to what extent public opinion has a systematic influence on the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Our evidence is based on the analysis of abstract judicial reviews and federal state disputes from 1974 to 2010. We show that the Federal Constitutional Court is the more likely to rule in favor of the opposition, the stronger the public supports the specific sub-stantive position of the opposition. Two mechanisms that could bring about this correla-tion are finally discussed. While the court does not blindly follow public opinion it will nevertheless consider the acceptance of its decisions as an important source of legitimacy.

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KW - Juicialization

KW - Abstract Review

KW - Federal State Disputes

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KW - abstrakte Normenkontrollen

KW - Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten

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