Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages

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Autoren

  • Olaf Hübler
  • Uwe Jirjahn

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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)471-491
Seitenumfang21
FachzeitschriftScottish Journal of Political Economy
Jahrgang50
Ausgabenummer4
Frühes Online-Datum2 Sept. 2003
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Sept. 2003

Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between establishment-level codetermination and industry-level collective bargaining in Germany. Based on a bargaining model, we derive our main hypothesis: In establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements, works councils are more likely to be engaged in productivity-enhancing activities and less engaged in rent-seeking activities than their counterparts in uncovered establishments. Our empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis. The presence of works councils exerts a positive impact on productivity within the covered industrial relations regime but not within the uncovered regime. The presence of works councils has a positive effect on wages within the uncovered regime but not to the same degree within the covered regime.

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Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages. / Hübler, Olaf; Jirjahn, Uwe.
in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Jahrgang 50, Nr. 4, 09.2003, S. 471-491.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Hübler O, Jirjahn U. Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2003 Sep;50(4):471-491. Epub 2003 Sep 2. doi: 10.1111/1467-9485.5004006
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