Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Autoren

  • Panu Poutvaara
  • Andreas Wagener

Externe Organisationen

  • Universität Helsinki
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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)105-124
Seitenumfang20
FachzeitschriftJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Jahrgang94
Ausgabenummer2
Frühes Online-Datum8 März 2008
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Juli 2008

Abstract

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Zitieren

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument. / Poutvaara, Panu; Wagener, Andreas.
in: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Jahrgang 94, Nr. 2, 07.2008, S. 105-124.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Poutvaara P, Wagener A. Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument. Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie. 2008 Jul;94(2):105-124. Epub 2008 Mär 8. doi: 10.1007/s00712-008-0002-6
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