Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel des Sammelwerks | Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium |
| Seiten | 4347-4364 |
| Seitenumfang | 18 |
| ISBN (elektronisch) | 9781939133243 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2021 |
| Veranstaltung | 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2021 - Virtual, Online Dauer: 11 Aug. 2021 → 13 Aug. 2021 |
Publikationsreihe
| Name | Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium |
|---|
Abstract
Android applications have a long history of being vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks due to insecure custom TLS certificate validation implementations. To resolve this, Google deployed the Network Security Configuration (NSC), a configuration-based approach to increase custom certificate validation logic security, and implemented safeguards in Google Play to block insecure applications. In this paper, we perform a large-scale in-depth investigation of the effectiveness of these countermeasures: First, we investigate the security of 99,212 NSC settings files in 1,335,322 Google Play apps using static code and manual analysis techniques. We find that 88.87% of the apps using custom NSC settings downgrade security compared to the default settings, and only 0.67% implement certificate pinning. Second, we penetrate Google Play's protection mechanisms by trying to publish apps that are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. In contrast to official announcements by Google, we found that Play does not effectively block vulnerable apps. Finally, we performed a static code analysis study of 15,000 apps and find that 5,511 recently published apps still contain vulnerable certificate validation code. Overall, we attribute most of the problems we find to insufficient support for developers, missing clarification of security risks in official documentation, and inadequate security checks for vulnerable applications in Google Play.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Informatik (insg.)
- Computernetzwerke und -kommunikation
- Informatik (insg.)
- Information systems
- Ingenieurwesen (insg.)
- Sicherheit, Risiko, Zuverlässigkeit und Qualität
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- BibTex
- RIS
Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium. 2021. S. 4347-4364 (Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium).
Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/Konferenzband › Aufsatz in Konferenzband › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Why Eve and mallory still love Android
T2 - 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2021
AU - Oltrogge, Marten
AU - Huaman, Nicolas
AU - Amft, Sabrina
AU - Acar, Yasemin
AU - Backes, Michael
AU - Fahl, Sascha
N1 - Funding Information: This research was partially funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA – 390781972).
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Android applications have a long history of being vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks due to insecure custom TLS certificate validation implementations. To resolve this, Google deployed the Network Security Configuration (NSC), a configuration-based approach to increase custom certificate validation logic security, and implemented safeguards in Google Play to block insecure applications. In this paper, we perform a large-scale in-depth investigation of the effectiveness of these countermeasures: First, we investigate the security of 99,212 NSC settings files in 1,335,322 Google Play apps using static code and manual analysis techniques. We find that 88.87% of the apps using custom NSC settings downgrade security compared to the default settings, and only 0.67% implement certificate pinning. Second, we penetrate Google Play's protection mechanisms by trying to publish apps that are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. In contrast to official announcements by Google, we found that Play does not effectively block vulnerable apps. Finally, we performed a static code analysis study of 15,000 apps and find that 5,511 recently published apps still contain vulnerable certificate validation code. Overall, we attribute most of the problems we find to insufficient support for developers, missing clarification of security risks in official documentation, and inadequate security checks for vulnerable applications in Google Play.
AB - Android applications have a long history of being vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks due to insecure custom TLS certificate validation implementations. To resolve this, Google deployed the Network Security Configuration (NSC), a configuration-based approach to increase custom certificate validation logic security, and implemented safeguards in Google Play to block insecure applications. In this paper, we perform a large-scale in-depth investigation of the effectiveness of these countermeasures: First, we investigate the security of 99,212 NSC settings files in 1,335,322 Google Play apps using static code and manual analysis techniques. We find that 88.87% of the apps using custom NSC settings downgrade security compared to the default settings, and only 0.67% implement certificate pinning. Second, we penetrate Google Play's protection mechanisms by trying to publish apps that are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. In contrast to official announcements by Google, we found that Play does not effectively block vulnerable apps. Finally, we performed a static code analysis study of 15,000 apps and find that 5,511 recently published apps still contain vulnerable certificate validation code. Overall, we attribute most of the problems we find to insufficient support for developers, missing clarification of security risks in official documentation, and inadequate security checks for vulnerable applications in Google Play.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85109657506&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85109657506
T3 - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 4347
EP - 4364
BT - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
Y2 - 11 August 2021 through 13 August 2021
ER -