Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 210-231 |
| Seitenumfang | 22 |
| Fachzeitschrift | European Policy Analysis |
| Jahrgang | 5 |
| Ausgabenummer | 2 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 27 Nov. 2019 |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Public administration
- Medizin (insg.)
- Health policy
- Umweltwissenschaften (insg.)
- Management, Monitoring, Politik und Recht
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in: European Policy Analysis, Jahrgang 5, Nr. 2, 27.11.2019, S. 210-231.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Wag the Dog
T2 - Governing German Rail from a Principal–Agent Perspective
AU - Döhler, Marian
N1 - Funding information: I thank the EPA reviewers and my colleagues Fabian Jakubowitz, Christina Lichtmannegger, and Eva Ruffing for useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.
PY - 2019/11/27
Y1 - 2019/11/27
N2 - Ever since German Rail, the largest state-owned enterprise in Germany, was converted into a stock company in 1994, the federal government has been criticized for a lack of policy ambitions. From a principal–agent perspective, the federal government gives the impression of being a reluctant principal. The first objective is therefore to explain the strategic interaction between the federal government and German Rail since the 1990s. The second aim is to increase the explanatory power of the principal–agent concept by adopting a strand of literature in which the principal's unilateralism and diverging preferences—standard assumptions in the principal–agent literature—are complemented by strategic cooperation, confluence, and inverted principal–agent interactions. This conceptual redirection, which considers the impact of a broader range of actors involved, not only explains key events in German rail policy but also highlights the advances of an elaborated principal–agent concept.
AB - Ever since German Rail, the largest state-owned enterprise in Germany, was converted into a stock company in 1994, the federal government has been criticized for a lack of policy ambitions. From a principal–agent perspective, the federal government gives the impression of being a reluctant principal. The first objective is therefore to explain the strategic interaction between the federal government and German Rail since the 1990s. The second aim is to increase the explanatory power of the principal–agent concept by adopting a strand of literature in which the principal's unilateralism and diverging preferences—standard assumptions in the principal–agent literature—are complemented by strategic cooperation, confluence, and inverted principal–agent interactions. This conceptual redirection, which considers the impact of a broader range of actors involved, not only explains key events in German rail policy but also highlights the advances of an elaborated principal–agent concept.
KW - confluence
KW - inverted principal–agent relations
KW - reluctant principal
KW - state-owned enterprise
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075556434&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/epa2.1049
DO - 10.1002/epa2.1049
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85075556434
VL - 5
SP - 210
EP - 231
JO - European Policy Analysis
JF - European Policy Analysis
IS - 2
ER -