TY - JOUR

T1 - Vulnerability of Smart Grid-enabled Protection Relays to IEMI

AU - Arduini, Fernando

AU - Lanzrath, Marian

AU - Ghosalkar, Samikshya

AU - Nateghi, Arash

AU - Schaarschmidt, Martin

AU - Fisahn, Svea

N1 - Funding Information: The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union´s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 812790 (MSCA-ETN PETER). This publication reflects only the authors’ view, exempting the European Union from any liability. Project website: http://etn-peter.eu/ (last access: 18 July 2023). Moreover, assistance provided by Michael Suhrke, Thorsten Pusch, Sven Ruge, Benjamin Jörres and Tobias Mallmann (all from Fraunhofer INT) was greatly appreciated. Funding Information: This research has been supported by the European Commission, Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (PETER (grant no. 812790)).

PY - 2023/7/27

Y1 - 2023/7/27

N2 - The electricity sector has been undergoing transformations towards the smart grid concept, which aims to improve the robustness, efficiency, and flexibility of the power system. This transition has been achieved by the introduction of smart electronic devices (SEDs) and advanced automatic control and communication systems. Despite the benefits of such modernization, safety issues have emerged with significant concern by experts and entities worldwide. One of these issues is known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), where offenders employ high-power electromagnetic sources to maliciously disrupt or damage electronic devices. One of the possible gateways for IEMI attacks targeting the smart grids is the microprocessor-based protection relays. On the one hand, the malfunctioning of these devices can lead to equipment damage, including high-voltage equipment (e.g., power transformers), which represent one of the most high-cost items of energy infrastructure. On the other hand, a possible misleading triggering of these devices could cause cascading effects along the various nodes of the power system, resulting in widespread blackouts. Thus, this study presents the possible recurring effects of IEMI exposure of a typical protection relay used in smart grid substations as part of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system. For this purpose, a test setup containing a smart grid protective unit, a monitoring box, and the device's wiring harness is exposed to radiated IEMI threats with high-power narrowband signals using a TEM waveguide and horn antennas. The effects during the test campaigns are observed by means of an IEMI-hardened camera system and a software developed to real-time monitor the device's fibre optic communication link, which is established according to the IEC 60870-5-105 protocol. The results revealed failures ranging from display deviation to various types of protection relay shutdown. Moreover, the consequences of the identified failures in a power substation are discussed to feed into a risk analysis regarding the threat of IEMI to power infrastructures.

AB - The electricity sector has been undergoing transformations towards the smart grid concept, which aims to improve the robustness, efficiency, and flexibility of the power system. This transition has been achieved by the introduction of smart electronic devices (SEDs) and advanced automatic control and communication systems. Despite the benefits of such modernization, safety issues have emerged with significant concern by experts and entities worldwide. One of these issues is known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), where offenders employ high-power electromagnetic sources to maliciously disrupt or damage electronic devices. One of the possible gateways for IEMI attacks targeting the smart grids is the microprocessor-based protection relays. On the one hand, the malfunctioning of these devices can lead to equipment damage, including high-voltage equipment (e.g., power transformers), which represent one of the most high-cost items of energy infrastructure. On the other hand, a possible misleading triggering of these devices could cause cascading effects along the various nodes of the power system, resulting in widespread blackouts. Thus, this study presents the possible recurring effects of IEMI exposure of a typical protection relay used in smart grid substations as part of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system. For this purpose, a test setup containing a smart grid protective unit, a monitoring box, and the device's wiring harness is exposed to radiated IEMI threats with high-power narrowband signals using a TEM waveguide and horn antennas. The effects during the test campaigns are observed by means of an IEMI-hardened camera system and a software developed to real-time monitor the device's fibre optic communication link, which is established according to the IEC 60870-5-105 protocol. The results revealed failures ranging from display deviation to various types of protection relay shutdown. Moreover, the consequences of the identified failures in a power substation are discussed to feed into a risk analysis regarding the threat of IEMI to power infrastructures.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85170827921&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.5194/ars-20-131-2023

DO - 10.5194/ars-20-131-2023

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85170827921

VL - 20

SP - 131

EP - 139

JO - Advances in Radio Science

JF - Advances in Radio Science

SN - 1684-9965

ER -