Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 105773 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Economic modelling |
| Jahrgang | 108 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 21 Jan. 2022 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - März 2022 |
Abstract
A corrupt government may not only fail in provision of public goods but also generate mistrust that depresses demand for essential public goods. The effect of corruption on supply of public goods is well studied, but much less is known about the demand side. Using UNICEF panel data on vaccination, we find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. We show theoretically that the mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung
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in: Economic modelling, Jahrgang 108, 105773, 03.2022.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Vaccination policy and trust
AU - Jelnov, Artyom
AU - Jelnov, Pavel
N1 - Funding Information: We thank Doron Klunover for a valuable discussion. We thank the editor and the anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
PY - 2022/3
Y1 - 2022/3
N2 - A corrupt government may not only fail in provision of public goods but also generate mistrust that depresses demand for essential public goods. The effect of corruption on supply of public goods is well studied, but much less is known about the demand side. Using UNICEF panel data on vaccination, we find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. We show theoretically that the mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine.
AB - A corrupt government may not only fail in provision of public goods but also generate mistrust that depresses demand for essential public goods. The effect of corruption on supply of public goods is well studied, but much less is known about the demand side. Using UNICEF panel data on vaccination, we find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. We show theoretically that the mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine.
KW - Corruption
KW - Vaccination
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85123722848&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.105773
DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.105773
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85123722848
VL - 108
JO - Economic modelling
JF - Economic modelling
SN - 0264-9993
M1 - 105773
ER -