Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 975-987 |
| Seitenumfang | 13 |
| Fachzeitschrift | European Journal of Political Economy |
| Jahrgang | 23 |
| Ausgabenummer | 4 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Dez. 2007 |
Abstract
We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Politikwissenschaften und internationale Beziehungen
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in: European Journal of Political Economy, Jahrgang 23, Nr. 4, 12.2007, S. 975-987.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - To draft or not to draft?
T2 - Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription
AU - Poutvaara, Panu
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.
AB - We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.
KW - Education
KW - Intergenerational fairness
KW - Military draft
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=36048979316&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.12.001
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.12.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:36048979316
VL - 23
SP - 975
EP - 987
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
IS - 4
ER -