TY - JOUR

T1 - The Value-Free Ideal of Science

T2 - A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community

AU - Ambrosj, Jacopo

AU - Dierickx, Kris

AU - Desmond, Hugh

N1 - Funding Information: This research is part of a project funded by the FWO, Research Foundation – Flanders (Grant Number: G0D6920N). Publisher Copyright: © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

PY - 2023/2

Y1 - 2023/2

N2 - Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.

AB - Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.

KW - Applied ethics

KW - Cognitive values

KW - Empirical philosophy

KW - Ethics of research

KW - Public trust

KW - Social epistemology

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85145957301&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11948-022-00427-9

DO - 10.1007/s11948-022-00427-9

M3 - Article

C2 - 36622481

AN - SCOPUS:85145957301

VL - 29

JO - Science and engineering ethics

JF - Science and engineering ethics

SN - 1353-3452

IS - 1

M1 - 1

ER -