The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy?

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Autorschaft

  • Michael Hübler
  • Axel Herdecke
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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)690-696
Seitenumfang7
FachzeitschriftApplied economics letters
Jahrgang27
Ausgabenummer9
Frühes Online-Datum29 Juli 2019
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2020

Abstract

This article evaluates the recent protectionist US trade policy and the retaliation of the EU and China. The article employs a New Quantitative Trade Theory model and an Armington model for comparison. The simulation results show that US car tariffs are a credible threat to the EU, but the steel and aluminum tariffs are not. China suffers considerably from the US tariffs, especially the latest extended, tightened tariffs. The retaliation measures of the EU and China, however, do not cause significant US welfare losses compared to the situation without mutual trade policy.

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The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy? / Hübler, Michael; Herdecke, Axel.
in: Applied economics letters, Jahrgang 27, Nr. 9, 2020, S. 690-696.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Hübler M, Herdecke A. The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy? Applied economics letters. 2020;27(9):690-696. Epub 2019 Jul 29. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1644428
Hübler, Michael ; Herdecke, Axel. / The US trade dispute : blunt offense or rational strategy?. in: Applied economics letters. 2020 ; Jahrgang 27, Nr. 9. S. 690-696.
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