Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Fachzeitschrift | Erkenntnis |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 20 Dez. 2022 |
| Publikationsstatus | Elektronisch veröffentlicht (E-Pub) - 20 Dez. 2022 |
Abstract
A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns on the fact that confirmation theory doesn’t recognize a difference between different sources of evidence. Most of the paper is devoted to rebutting various objections designed to show that it should. I end by explaining why philosophers of science have (often) gone wrong on this point.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Philosophie
- Mathematik (insg.)
- Logik
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in: Erkenntnis, 20.12.2022.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments
AU - Dethier, Corey
N1 - Funding Information: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Funding for this paper was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) - Project 254954344/GRK2073
PY - 2022/12/20
Y1 - 2022/12/20
N2 - A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns on the fact that confirmation theory doesn’t recognize a difference between different sources of evidence. Most of the paper is devoted to rebutting various objections designed to show that it should. I end by explaining why philosophers of science have (often) gone wrong on this point.
AB - A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns on the fact that confirmation theory doesn’t recognize a difference between different sources of evidence. Most of the paper is devoted to rebutting various objections designed to show that it should. I end by explaining why philosophers of science have (often) gone wrong on this point.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85144222012&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-022-00649-0
DO - 10.1007/s10670-022-00649-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85144222012
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
SN - 0165-0106
ER -