Details
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Qualifikation | Ph.D. |
Gradverleihende Hochschule |
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Betreut von |
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Erscheinungsort | Mannheim |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Apr. 2021 |
Extern publiziert | Ja |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Allgemeine Sozialwissenschaften
Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung
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Mannheim, 2021. 245 S.
Publikation: Qualifikations-/Studienabschlussarbeit › Dissertation
}
TY - BOOK
T1 - The Two Faces of Judicial Power
T2 - Dynamics of Judicial-Political Bargaining
AU - Engst, Benjamin Gerhard
PY - 2021/4
Y1 - 2021/4
N2 - This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial–political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government’s ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization.
AB - This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial–political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government’s ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization.
KW - Autolimitation
KW - Constitutional Court
KW - Directives
KW - Empirical Jurisprudence
KW - German Federal Constitutional Court
KW - Government
KW - Judicial Decision-making
KW - Judicial Directives
KW - Judicial Independence
KW - Judicial Politics
KW - Judicial Power
KW - Judicial-Legislative
KW - Judicial-Political
KW - Jurisprudence
KW - Law and Courts
KW - Legislation
KW - Representative Democracy
KW - Separation of Powers
KW - Separation-of-Powers
KW - Supreme Court
M3 - Doctoral thesis
CY - Mannheim
ER -