Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 37-45 |
| Seitenumfang | 9 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Management science |
| Jahrgang | 62 |
| Ausgabenummer | 1 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Jan. 2016 |
Abstract
We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Strategie und Management
- Entscheidungswissenschaften (insg.)
- Managementlehre und Operations Resarch
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in: Management science, Jahrgang 62, Nr. 1, 01.2016, S. 37-45.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The spillover effects of monitoring
T2 - A field experiment
AU - Belot, Michèle
AU - Schröder, Marina
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Copyright 2016, INFORMS.
PY - 2016/1
Y1 - 2016/1
N2 - We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.
AB - We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.
KW - Counterproductive behavior
KW - Field experiment
KW - Monitoring
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84961382119&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2089
DO - 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2089
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84961382119
VL - 62
SP - 37
EP - 45
JO - Management science
JF - Management science
SN - 0025-1909
IS - 1
ER -