Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 76 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Games |
| Jahrgang | 12 |
| Ausgabenummer | 4 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Dez. 2021 |
Abstract
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Mathematik (insg.)
- Statistik und Wahrscheinlichkeit
- Entscheidungswissenschaften (insg.)
- Statistik, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Ungewissheit
- Mathematik (insg.)
- Angewandte Mathematik
Zitieren
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTex
- RIS
in: Games, Jahrgang 12, Nr. 4, 76, 12.2021.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures
AU - Bannikova, Marina
AU - Jelnov, Artyom
AU - Jelnov, Pavel
N1 - Funding Information: Funding: Financial support by COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice is acknowledged.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
AB - This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
KW - Legislature
KW - Lobbyist
KW - Parties
KW - Voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85117827035&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3390/g12040076
DO - 10.3390/g12040076
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85117827035
VL - 12
JO - Games
JF - Games
IS - 4
M1 - 76
ER -