Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 105702 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Journal of economic theory |
| Jahrgang | 212 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 20 Juli 2023 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Sept. 2023 |
Abstract
We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs are rare even when they are feasible; and experiments produce results infrequently. Our results shed light on recent criticism of the science system.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: Journal of economic theory, Jahrgang 212, 105702, 09.2023.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning
AU - Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun
AU - Katsenos, Georgios
AU - Ozdenoren, Emre
N1 - Funding Information: We are grateful to the editors and three anonymous referees for very valuable comments. We thank Catherine Bobtcheff, Marina Halac, Ehud Kalai, Peter A. Lawrence, Thomas Mariotti, Sven Rady, Yiman Sun, Stephan Thomsen, Julia Wirtz, and participants at the ESWC 2020 (Bocconi) for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper entitled “Experimentation, Learning and Preemption”. We thank especially Morton Kamien and Konstantin Wewetzer for discussions that inspired this work. Georgios Katsenos wishes to thank his early academic mentor Wilbur Jónsson. Financial support of the German Research Foundation ( DFG HO 3814/1-1 ) is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2023/9
Y1 - 2023/9
N2 - We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs are rare even when they are feasible; and experiments produce results infrequently. Our results shed light on recent criticism of the science system.
AB - We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs are rare even when they are feasible; and experiments produce results infrequently. Our results shed light on recent criticism of the science system.
KW - Experimentation
KW - Learning
KW - Multiarmed bandit problem
KW - Preemption
KW - Stopping game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85166574384&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105702
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105702
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85166574384
VL - 212
JO - Journal of economic theory
JF - Journal of economic theory
SN - 0022-0531
M1 - 105702
ER -