Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 1269-1288 |
| Seitenumfang | 20 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Erkenntnis |
| Jahrgang | 88 |
| Ausgabenummer | 3 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 7 Mai 2021 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - März 2023 |
Abstract
Recently, both evolutionary anthropologists and some philosophers have argued that cooperative social settings unique to humans play an important role in the development of both our cognitive capacities and what Michael Tomasello terms the “construction” of “normative rationality” or “a normative point of view as a self-regulating mechanism.” In this article, I use evolutionary game theory to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that cooperation fosters epistemic rationality. Employing an extension of signal-receiver games that I term “telephone games,” I show that cooperative contexts work as advertised: under plausible conditions, these scenarios favor epistemically rational agents over irrational ones designed to do just as well as them in non-interactive contexts. I then show that the basic results are strengthened by introducing complications that make the game more realistic.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Philosophie
- Mathematik (insg.)
- Logik
Zitieren
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTex
- RIS
in: Erkenntnis, Jahrgang 88, Nr. 3, 03.2023, S. 1269-1288.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Cooperative Origins of Epistemic Rationality?
AU - Dethier, Corey Nathaniel
N1 - Funding Information: I’d like to thank Hannah Rubin for comments on an earlier version of this paper, and both Hannah Rubin and Mike Schneider for a number of extremely fruitful conversations on both the topics pursued here and the methods employed.
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - Recently, both evolutionary anthropologists and some philosophers have argued that cooperative social settings unique to humans play an important role in the development of both our cognitive capacities and what Michael Tomasello terms the “construction” of “normative rationality” or “a normative point of view as a self-regulating mechanism.” In this article, I use evolutionary game theory to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that cooperation fosters epistemic rationality. Employing an extension of signal-receiver games that I term “telephone games,” I show that cooperative contexts work as advertised: under plausible conditions, these scenarios favor epistemically rational agents over irrational ones designed to do just as well as them in non-interactive contexts. I then show that the basic results are strengthened by introducing complications that make the game more realistic.
AB - Recently, both evolutionary anthropologists and some philosophers have argued that cooperative social settings unique to humans play an important role in the development of both our cognitive capacities and what Michael Tomasello terms the “construction” of “normative rationality” or “a normative point of view as a self-regulating mechanism.” In this article, I use evolutionary game theory to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that cooperation fosters epistemic rationality. Employing an extension of signal-receiver games that I term “telephone games,” I show that cooperative contexts work as advertised: under plausible conditions, these scenarios favor epistemically rational agents over irrational ones designed to do just as well as them in non-interactive contexts. I then show that the basic results are strengthened by introducing complications that make the game more realistic.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85105516338&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-021-00401-0
DO - 10.1007/s10670-021-00401-0
M3 - Article
VL - 88
SP - 1269
EP - 1288
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
IS - 3
ER -