Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Autorschaft

  • Kay Blaufus
  • Janine K. Jarzembski
  • Jakob Reineke
  • Ilko Trenn

Organisationseinheiten

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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
FachzeitschriftJournal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
PublikationsstatusElektronisch veröffentlicht (E-Pub) - 9 Okt. 2023

Abstract

We use a sample of 248 tax strategies published by U.K. companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 and FTSE 250 to examine (a) how companies present themselves—more as “responsible taxpayers” who view taxes as a meaningful contribution to society, or more as “tax planners” who view taxes primarily as a cost, and (b) whether these presentations correspond to actual tax avoidance behavior. Our results show that, on average, firms tend to portray themselves as “responsible taxpayers,” but that this portrayal is consistent with firms’ tax avoidance behavior only when firms are subject to above-average external monitoring by financial analysts. The results suggest that firms manage the content of qualitative tax disclosures to sway public opinion as long as the probability of detecting misstatements is sufficiently low. This raises doubts as to whether mandatory qualitative information provides added value for stakeholders if it is not under external review. JEL Classification: H25; H20; M40; M48.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Zitieren

Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy. / Blaufus, Kay; Jarzembski, Janine K.; Reineke, Jakob et al.
in: Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 09.10.2023.

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Blaufus, K, Jarzembski, JK, Reineke, J & Trenn, I 2023, 'Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy', Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X231200913
Blaufus, K., Jarzembski, J. K., Reineke, J., & Trenn, I. (2023). Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. Vorabveröffentlichung online. https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X231200913
Blaufus K, Jarzembski JK, Reineke J, Trenn I. Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. 2023 Okt 9. Epub 2023 Okt 9. doi: 10.1177/0148558X231200913
Blaufus, Kay ; Jarzembski, Janine K. ; Reineke, Jakob et al. / Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy. in: Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. 2023.
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