Profit tax competition and formula apportionment

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Autoren

  • Rüdiger Pethig
  • Andreas Wagener

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  • Universität Siegen
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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)631-655
Seitenumfang25
FachzeitschriftInternational Tax and Public Finance
Jahrgang14
Ausgabenummer6
Frühes Online-Datum21 Feb. 2007
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Dez. 2007

Abstract

We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

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Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. / Pethig, Rüdiger; Wagener, Andreas.
in: International Tax and Public Finance, Jahrgang 14, Nr. 6, 12.2007, S. 631-655.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Pethig R, Wagener A. Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. International Tax and Public Finance. 2007 Dez;14(6):631-655. Epub 2007 Feb 21. doi: 10.1007/s10797-006-9017-5
Pethig, Rüdiger ; Wagener, Andreas. / Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. in: International Tax and Public Finance. 2007 ; Jahrgang 14, Nr. 6. S. 631-655.
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