Details
Originalsprache | Englisch |
---|---|
Seiten (von - bis) | 631-655 |
Seitenumfang | 25 |
Fachzeitschrift | International Tax and Public Finance |
Jahrgang | 14 |
Ausgabenummer | 6 |
Frühes Online-Datum | 21 Feb. 2007 |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Dez. 2007 |
Abstract
We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Bilanzierung
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Finanzwesen
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: International Tax and Public Finance, Jahrgang 14, Nr. 6, 12.2007, S. 631-655.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Profit tax competition and formula apportionment
AU - Pethig, Rüdiger
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas.
AB - We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas.
KW - Formula apportionment
KW - Tax competition
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34748872568&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10797-006-9017-5
DO - 10.1007/s10797-006-9017-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34748872568
VL - 14
SP - 631
EP - 655
JO - International Tax and Public Finance
JF - International Tax and Public Finance
SN - 0927-5940
IS - 6
ER -