Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 1165-1176 |
| Seitenumfang | 12 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Philosophy of Science |
| Jahrgang | 84 |
| Ausgabenummer | 5 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2017 |
Abstract
It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory research.
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in: Philosophy of Science, Jahrgang 84, Nr. 5, 2017, S. 1165-1176.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Phenomena and Objects of Research in the Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences
AU - Feest, Uljana
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2017 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory research.
AB - It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory research.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85038248947&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/694155
DO - 10.1086/694155
M3 - Article
VL - 84
SP - 1165
EP - 1176
JO - Philosophy of Science
JF - Philosophy of Science
SN - 0031-8248
IS - 5
ER -