Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Autoren

  • Meghdad Attarzadeh
  • David K. H. Chua
  • Michael Beer
  • Ernest L. S. Abbott

Externe Organisationen

  • National University of Singapore
  • The University of Liverpool
  • Tongji University
  • Nanyang Technological University (NTU)
Forschungs-netzwerk anzeigen

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)676-692
Seitenumfang17
FachzeitschriftConstruction Management and Economics
Jahrgang35
Ausgabenummer11-12
Frühes Online-Datum16 Mai 2017
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2 Dez. 2017

Abstract

The success of public–private partnership (PPP)–build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have become moribund.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Zitieren

Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. / Attarzadeh, Meghdad; Chua, David K. H.; Beer, Michael et al.
in: Construction Management and Economics, Jahrgang 35, Nr. 11-12, 02.12.2017, S. 676-692.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Attarzadeh, M, Chua, DKH, Beer, M & Abbott, ELS 2017, 'Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects', Construction Management and Economics, Jg. 35, Nr. 11-12, S. 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D. K. H., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. L. S. (2017). Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(11-12), 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Attarzadeh M, Chua DKH, Beer M, Abbott ELS. Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics. 2017 Dez 2;35(11-12):676-692. Epub 2017 Mai 16. doi: 10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Attarzadeh, Meghdad ; Chua, David K. H. ; Beer, Michael et al. / Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. in: Construction Management and Economics. 2017 ; Jahrgang 35, Nr. 11-12. S. 676-692.
Download
@article{7808ac6bec5945ffbfa5083358f78db9,
title = "Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects",
abstract = "The success of public–private partnership (PPP)–build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky projects. The purpose of this paper{\textquoteright}s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have become moribund.",
keywords = "build–operate–transfer, negotiation, private finance, public–private partnerships, Real options",
author = "Meghdad Attarzadeh and Chua, {David K. H.} and Michael Beer and Abbott, {Ernest L. S.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2017",
month = dec,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "676--692",
number = "11-12",

}

Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects

AU - Attarzadeh, Meghdad

AU - Chua, David K. H.

AU - Beer, Michael

AU - Abbott, Ernest L. S.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2017/12/2

Y1 - 2017/12/2

N2 - The success of public–private partnership (PPP)–build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have become moribund.

AB - The success of public–private partnership (PPP)–build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have become moribund.

KW - build–operate–transfer

KW - negotiation

KW - private finance

KW - public–private partnerships

KW - Real options

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85019240317&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962

DO - 10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85019240317

VL - 35

SP - 676

EP - 692

JO - Construction Management and Economics

JF - Construction Management and Economics

SN - 0144-6193

IS - 11-12

ER -

Von denselben Autoren