Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel des Sammelwerks | Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems |
| Untertitel | Proceedings of the 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015 |
| Herausgeber/-innen | Luca Podofillini, Bruno Sudret, Božidar Stojadinović, Enrico Zio, Wolfgang Kröger |
| Seiten | 2781-2788 |
| Seitenumfang | 8 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2015 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
| Veranstaltung | 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015 - Zurich, Swasiland Dauer: 7 Sept. 2015 → 10 Sept. 2015 |
Abstract
In this paper, we use a mathematical model based on the principal-agency theory to design risk regulatory policies in the implementation of a complex energy project under two cases; moral hazard and risk aversion and moral hazard and limited liability. The risk regulation aims to reduce the probability of accident as a result of contractor’s risky activities and is defined by three policies; level of effort, transfer and fine. Under risk aversion, the regulator implements the second best level of effort with fine equal to damage cost. The optimal transfer extracts all the rent from the contractor and increases with the risk aversion coefficient of the contractor and the variance of the hazard. Under limited liability, the regulator implements a higher second best level of effort which increases with the weight parameter and the damage cost. A higher effort requires a higher fine and the optimal transfer leaves a liability rent which increases with the damage cost and the weight parameter.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Ingenieurwesen (insg.)
- Sicherheit, Risiko, Zuverlässigkeit und Qualität
Zitieren
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTex
- RIS
Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems: Proceedings of the 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015. Hrsg. / Luca Podofillini; Bruno Sudret; Božidar Stojadinović; Enrico Zio; Wolfgang Kröger. 2015. S. 2781-2788.
Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/Konferenzband › Aufsatz in Konferenzband › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Optimal risk regulatory policy in the development of a geological disposal facility
AU - Nieto-Cerezo, Oscar
AU - Patelli, Edoardo
AU - Beer, Michael
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - In this paper, we use a mathematical model based on the principal-agency theory to design risk regulatory policies in the implementation of a complex energy project under two cases; moral hazard and risk aversion and moral hazard and limited liability. The risk regulation aims to reduce the probability of accident as a result of contractor’s risky activities and is defined by three policies; level of effort, transfer and fine. Under risk aversion, the regulator implements the second best level of effort with fine equal to damage cost. The optimal transfer extracts all the rent from the contractor and increases with the risk aversion coefficient of the contractor and the variance of the hazard. Under limited liability, the regulator implements a higher second best level of effort which increases with the weight parameter and the damage cost. A higher effort requires a higher fine and the optimal transfer leaves a liability rent which increases with the damage cost and the weight parameter.
AB - In this paper, we use a mathematical model based on the principal-agency theory to design risk regulatory policies in the implementation of a complex energy project under two cases; moral hazard and risk aversion and moral hazard and limited liability. The risk regulation aims to reduce the probability of accident as a result of contractor’s risky activities and is defined by three policies; level of effort, transfer and fine. Under risk aversion, the regulator implements the second best level of effort with fine equal to damage cost. The optimal transfer extracts all the rent from the contractor and increases with the risk aversion coefficient of the contractor and the variance of the hazard. Under limited liability, the regulator implements a higher second best level of effort which increases with the weight parameter and the damage cost. A higher effort requires a higher fine and the optimal transfer leaves a liability rent which increases with the damage cost and the weight parameter.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84959018033&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84959018033
SN - 9781138028791
SP - 2781
EP - 2788
BT - Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems
A2 - Podofillini, Luca
A2 - Sudret, Bruno
A2 - Stojadinović, Božidar
A2 - Zio, Enrico
A2 - Kröger, Wolfgang
T2 - 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015
Y2 - 7 September 2015 through 10 September 2015
ER -