TY - JOUR

T1 - On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science

AU - Hangel, Nora

AU - ChoGlueck, Christopher

N1 - Funding Information: This article is supported by the German DFG grant #500479165 (9/2022-2025) for the project: The role of scientific judgment in generating knowledge.

PY - 2023/4

Y1 - 2023/4

N2 - While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.

AB - While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.

KW - Boundary-work

KW - Empirical philosophy of science

KW - Philosophical methods

KW - Qualitative methodology

KW - Scientific practice

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85148669868&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.12.009

DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.12.009

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85148669868

VL - 98

SP - 29

EP - 39

JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

SN - 0039-3681

ER -