Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel des Sammelwerks | Safety and Reliability |
| Untertitel | Methodology and Applications |
| Seiten | 481-486 |
| Seitenumfang | 6 |
| ISBN (elektronisch) | 9780429226823 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2014 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
| Veranstaltung | European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014 - Wroclaw, Polen Dauer: 14 Sept. 2014 → 18 Sept. 2014 |
Abstract
In this research, we analyse a mathematical model using principal-agent theory where NDA delegates the implementation of a GDF to site licenced companies through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. A risk sharing incentive mechanism is designed to overcome the moral hazard problem when agents hide information on the level of risk, in order to accomplish the highest level of economic, environmental and social performance. An application to a simplified model will show the potential of the proposed approach. This paper will be of interest to academic and consultants concerned with the design of incentive contracts in the nuclear industry.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Ingenieurwesen (insg.)
- Sicherheit, Risiko, Zuverlässigkeit und Qualität
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Safety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications. 2014. S. 481-486.
Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/Konferenzband › Aufsatz in Konferenzband › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Mechanism design for risk allocation and benefit sharing in the development of a Geological Disposal Facility for nuclear radioactive waste
AU - Nieto-Cerezo, Oscar
AU - Patelli, Edoardo
AU - Wenzelburger, Jan
AU - Beer, Michael
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - In this research, we analyse a mathematical model using principal-agent theory where NDA delegates the implementation of a GDF to site licenced companies through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. A risk sharing incentive mechanism is designed to overcome the moral hazard problem when agents hide information on the level of risk, in order to accomplish the highest level of economic, environmental and social performance. An application to a simplified model will show the potential of the proposed approach. This paper will be of interest to academic and consultants concerned with the design of incentive contracts in the nuclear industry.
AB - In this research, we analyse a mathematical model using principal-agent theory where NDA delegates the implementation of a GDF to site licenced companies through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. A risk sharing incentive mechanism is designed to overcome the moral hazard problem when agents hide information on the level of risk, in order to accomplish the highest level of economic, environmental and social performance. An application to a simplified model will show the potential of the proposed approach. This paper will be of interest to academic and consultants concerned with the design of incentive contracts in the nuclear industry.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906656029&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1201/b17399-73
DO - 10.1201/b17399-73
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781138026810
SP - 481
EP - 486
BT - Safety and Reliability
T2 - European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014
Y2 - 14 September 2014 through 18 September 2014
ER -