Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 371-396 |
| Seitenumfang | 26 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy |
| Jahrgang | 15 |
| Ausgabenummer | 2 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Juni 2006 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
Abstract
We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Allgemeine Unternehmensführung und Buchhaltung
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Strategie und Management
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Technologie- und Innovationsmanagement
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in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Jahrgang 15, Nr. 2, 06.2006, S. 371-396.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - License auctions and market structure
AU - Hoppe, Heidrun C.
AU - Jehiel, Philippe
AU - Moldovanu, Benny
PY - 2006/6
Y1 - 2006/6
N2 - We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.
AB - We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33646247393&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33646247393
VL - 15
SP - 371
EP - 396
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
SN - 1058-6407
IS - 2
ER -