Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 767-795 |
| Seitenumfang | 29 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Journal of public economic theory |
| Jahrgang | 16 |
| Ausgabenummer | 5 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 10 Okt. 2013 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 15 Aug. 2014 |
Abstract
In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Finanzwesen
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: Journal of public economic theory, Jahrgang 16, Nr. 5, 15.08.2014, S. 767-795.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Laboratory federalism
T2 - The open method of coordination (OMC) as an evolutionary learning process
AU - Ania, Ana B.
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2014/8/15
Y1 - 2014/8/15
N2 - In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
AB - In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906076853&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12079
DO - 10.1111/jpet.12079
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84906076853
VL - 16
SP - 767
EP - 795
JO - Journal of public economic theory
JF - Journal of public economic theory
SN - 1097-3923
IS - 5
ER -