Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 21 |
| Fachzeitschrift | IZA Journal of Labor Policy |
| Jahrgang | 3 |
| Ausgabenummer | 1 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 8 Okt. 2014 |
Abstract
In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Organisationslehre und Personalmanagement
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in: IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Jahrgang 3, Nr. 1, 21, 08.10.2014.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions
T2 - an effective tool to increase employment?
AU - Boockmann, Bernhard
AU - Thomsen, Stephan L.
AU - Walter, Thomas
PY - 2014/10/8
Y1 - 2014/10/8
N2 - In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
AB - In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
KW - Benefit sanctions
KW - IV
KW - LATE
KW - Welfare recipients
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84983289177&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1186/2193-9004-3-21
DO - 10.1186/2193-9004-3-21
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84983289177
VL - 3
JO - IZA Journal of Labor Policy
JF - IZA Journal of Labor Policy
IS - 1
M1 - 21
ER -