Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 30-50 |
| Seitenumfang | 21 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Journal of economic theory |
| Jahrgang | 121 |
| Ausgabenummer | 1 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - März 2005 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
Abstract
We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung
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in: Journal of economic theory, Jahrgang 121, Nr. 1, 03.2005, S. 30-50.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Innovation timing games
T2 - A general framework with applications
AU - Hoppe, Heidrun C.
AU - Lehmann-Grube, Ulrich
PY - 2005/3
Y1 - 2005/3
N2 - We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.
AB - We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.
KW - Innovation
KW - Preemption
KW - R&D
KW - Simple timing games
KW - Waiting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=13944277785&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.002
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:13944277785
VL - 121
SP - 30
EP - 50
JO - Journal of economic theory
JF - Journal of economic theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -