Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 2083-2095 |
| Seitenumfang | 13 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Economic inquiry |
| Jahrgang | 51 |
| Ausgabenummer | 4 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 3 Apr. 2013 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 23 Aug. 2013 |
Abstract
Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Allgemeine Unternehmensführung und Buchhaltung
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: Economic inquiry, Jahrgang 51, Nr. 4, 23.08.2013, S. 2083-2095.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents
AU - Kolmar, Martin
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2013/8/23
Y1 - 2013/8/23
N2 - Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
AB - Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84882869120&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12012
DO - 10.1111/ecin.12012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84882869120
VL - 51
SP - 2083
EP - 2095
JO - Economic inquiry
JF - Economic inquiry
SN - 0095-2583
IS - 4
ER -