Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 4 |
| Seitenumfang | 28 |
| Fachzeitschrift | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
| Jahrgang | 12 |
| Ausgabenummer | 1 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 8 Jan. 2022 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - März 2022 |
Abstract
Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Wissenschaftsgeschichte und -philosophie
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in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Jahrgang 12, Nr. 1, 4, 03.2022.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - How to Incorporate Non-Epistemic Values into a Theory of Classification
AU - Reydon, Thomas A.C.
AU - Ereshefsky, Marc
PY - 2022/3
Y1 - 2022/3
N2 - Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values.
AB - Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values.
KW - GFA
KW - Grounded functionality account of natural kinds
KW - Natural kinds
KW - Non-epistemic values
KW - Values
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122762141&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s13194-021-00438-6
DO - 10.1007/s13194-021-00438-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85122762141
VL - 12
JO - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
SN - 1879-4912
IS - 1
M1 - 4
ER -