Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 349 |
| Seitenumfang | 1 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Nature Comm. |
| Jahrgang | 2 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2011 |
Abstract
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in: Nature Comm., Jahrgang 2, 2011, S. 349.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Full field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
AU - Gerhardt, I.
AU - Liu, Q.
AU - Lamas-Linares, A.
AU - Skaar, J.
AU - Kurtsiefer, C.
AU - Makarov, V.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to grow a shared secret key. Its security is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics, but in reality it significantly relies on the physical implementation. Many technological imperfections in QKD systems were explored, whereas no attack on an established QKD connection has been realized so far. Here we show the first full field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD connection. An installed eavesdropper obtains the entire `secret' key, while none of the parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicate a security breach. This confirms that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.
AB - Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to grow a shared secret key. Its security is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics, but in reality it significantly relies on the physical implementation. Many technological imperfections in QKD systems were explored, whereas no attack on an established QKD connection has been realized so far. Here we show the first full field implementation of a complete attack on a running QKD connection. An installed eavesdropper obtains the entire `secret' key, while none of the parameters monitored by the legitimate parties indicate a security breach. This confirms that non-idealities in physical implementations of QKD can be fully practically exploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if quantum cryptography is to become highly secure.
KW - Quantum Key Distribution
KW - Quantum Cryptogrpahy
KW - QKD
KW - Quantum Hacking
KW - Single Photon Detectors
M3 - Article
VL - 2
SP - 349
JO - Nature Comm.
JF - Nature Comm.
ER -