Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 112 |
| Fachzeitschrift | SYNTHESE |
| Jahrgang | 204 |
| Ausgabenummer | 4 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 16 Sept. 2024 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Okt. 2024 |
Abstract
There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Philosophie
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Allgemeine Sozialwissenschaften
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in: SYNTHESE, Jahrgang 204, Nr. 4, 112, 10.2024.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - For values in science
T2 - Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science
AU - Brown, Matthew J.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2024.
PY - 2024/10
Y1 - 2024/10
N2 - There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.
AB - There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85204070060&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1
DO - 10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85204070060
VL - 204
JO - SYNTHESE
JF - SYNTHESE
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 4
M1 - 112
ER -