Coping with rational prodigals: A theory of social security and savings subsidies

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  • Stefan Homburg

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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)47-58
Seitenumfang12
FachzeitschriftECONOMICA
Jahrgang73
Ausgabenummer289
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 20 Feb. 2006

Abstract

The rational prodigality argument, which often serves to justify social security, is considered in a second-best tax framework with endogenous labour supply. Rational prodigality renders the familiar policies time-inconsistent. I analyse time-consistent policies and show that a wage tax suffices to rule out prodigality as a rational strategy. However, by using savings subsidies the solution can be improved upon. The subsidies are shown to be decreasing in income. A social security system with increasing contributions is not needed in either case.

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Coping with rational prodigals: A theory of social security and savings subsidies. / Homburg, Stefan.
in: ECONOMICA, Jahrgang 73, Nr. 289, 20.02.2006, S. 47-58.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Homburg S. Coping with rational prodigals: A theory of social security and savings subsidies. ECONOMICA. 2006 Feb 20;73(289):47-58. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00447.x
Homburg, Stefan. / Coping with rational prodigals : A theory of social security and savings subsidies. in: ECONOMICA. 2006 ; Jahrgang 73, Nr. 289. S. 47-58.
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