Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen

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  • Stefan Homburg

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Titel in ÜbersetzungColonel Blotto and his economic applications
OriginalspracheDeutsch
Seiten (von - bis)1-11
Seitenumfang11
FachzeitschriftPerspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
Jahrgang12
Ausgabenummer1
Frühes Online-Datum21 Feb. 2011
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Feb. 2011

Abstract

Redistributional issues are important in contemporary welfare states. These issues cannot be analyzed using the median voter theorem because preferences fail single-peakedness: Collective preferences are intransitive, giving rise to cyclical preferences. A suitable instrument for analyzing redistributional issues is the Colonel Blotto game. This game is older than the more familiar prisoner's dilemma, but it has been solved only recently. The article introduces the Colonel Blotto Game as well as the general structure of its solutions. Thereafter, the game's logic is illustrated using several policy examples. The two most fascinating results state that, in a political contest, it is never optimal to use pure strategies, and that the political process itself induces remarkable inequalities.

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Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen. / Homburg, Stefan.
in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Jahrgang 12, Nr. 1, 02.2011, S. 1-11.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Homburg S. Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. 2011 Feb;12(1):1-11. Epub 2011 Feb 21. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2010.00347.x, 10.15488/3112
Homburg, Stefan. / Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen. in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. 2011 ; Jahrgang 12, Nr. 1. S. 1-11.
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