Details
Originalsprache | Englisch |
---|---|
Titel des Sammelwerks | Physical Layer Security |
Herausgeber (Verlag) | Springer International Publishing AG |
Seiten | 83-97 |
Seitenumfang | 15 |
ISBN (elektronisch) | 9783030553661 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030553654 |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2021 |
Extern publiziert | Ja |
Abstract
Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to classical encryption schemes, the security of a QKD system does not depend on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems. However, QKD systems can be subject to different kinds of attacks, exploiting engineering, and technical imperfections of the components forming the systems. Here, we review the security vulnerabilities of QKD. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks. We equally highlight the method for quantifying backflash emission and the different ways to mitigate this effect.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Ingenieurwesen (insg.)
- Allgemeiner Maschinenbau
- Informatik (insg.)
- Allgemeine Computerwissenschaft
- Physik und Astronomie (insg.)
- Allgemeine Physik und Astronomie
Zitieren
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTex
- RIS
Physical Layer Security. Springer International Publishing AG, 2021. S. 83-97.
Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/Konferenzband › Beitrag in Buch/Sammelwerk › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Backflash light as a security vulnerability in quantum key distribution systems
AU - Vybornyi, Ivan
AU - Trichili, Abderrahmen
AU - Alouini, Mohamed Slim
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to classical encryption schemes, the security of a QKD system does not depend on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems. However, QKD systems can be subject to different kinds of attacks, exploiting engineering, and technical imperfections of the components forming the systems. Here, we review the security vulnerabilities of QKD. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks. We equally highlight the method for quantifying backflash emission and the different ways to mitigate this effect.
AB - Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to classical encryption schemes, the security of a QKD system does not depend on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems. However, QKD systems can be subject to different kinds of attacks, exploiting engineering, and technical imperfections of the components forming the systems. Here, we review the security vulnerabilities of QKD. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks. We equally highlight the method for quantifying backflash emission and the different ways to mitigate this effect.
KW - Backflash effect
KW - Eavesdropping attacks
KW - Quantum cryptography
KW - Quantum hacking
KW - Quantum key distribution
KW - Single photons
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85149161545&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-55366-1_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-55366-1_4
M3 - Contribution to book/anthology
AN - SCOPUS:85149161545
SN - 9783030553654
SP - 83
EP - 97
BT - Physical Layer Security
PB - Springer International Publishing AG
ER -