Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 1-9 |
| Seitenumfang | 9 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Jahrgang | 96 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 29 Aug. 2018 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Nov. 2018 |
Abstract
It is a widely known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finite number of firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). In this paper, we provide an alternative analysis of an asymmetric oligopoly market, which does not lead to marginal cost pricing and the competitive outcome in the long-run.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Psychologie (insg.)
- Entscheidungswissenschaften (insg.)
- Statistik, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Ungewissheit
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in: Mathematical Social Sciences, Jahrgang 96, 11.2018, S. 1-9.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Übersichtsarbeit › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability
AU - Leininger, Wolfgang
AU - Markazi Moghadam, Hamed
N1 - Funding Information: Financial support from Ruhr Graduate School in Economics , Germany is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.
PY - 2018/11
Y1 - 2018/11
N2 - It is a widely known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finite number of firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). In this paper, we provide an alternative analysis of an asymmetric oligopoly market, which does not lead to marginal cost pricing and the competitive outcome in the long-run.
AB - It is a widely known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finite number of firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). In this paper, we provide an alternative analysis of an asymmetric oligopoly market, which does not lead to marginal cost pricing and the competitive outcome in the long-run.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053024293&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.002
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.002
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85053024293
VL - 96
SP - 1
EP - 9
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
SN - 0165-4896
ER -